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NEW YORK'S NEW HOME EQUITY THEFT 
PREVENTION ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Dr. Alka Bramhandkar* 
Gwen Seaquist, J.D.** 
The main stream media has been heralding a crisis in the 
sub-prime mortgage sector. Newspaper and television reports 
are replete with alarming news, leading viewers to believe that 
the current crisis developed overnight. The purpose of this 
paper will be to examine how this crisis is not an over-night 
phenomenon, but the result of a series of decisions that took 
place over a decade and which arose from a variety of factors 
that some have compared to the banking problems of the 
1930's. This paper will also examine the vast repercussions 
these decisions have had on the entire U. S. economy, some of 
which are already showing in the retail sector. Finally, we will 
conclude with recent New York legislation meant to stave off 
at least a part of this crisis by enacting consumer protection 
legislation for purchasers of foreclosed properties ... 
Overview of the Fiscal Crisis 
One of the main culprits of the current financial crisis has 
been the lending financial institutions themselves. 
*Associate Professor of Finance & International Business, 
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With seeming cooperation from mortgage brokers, appraisers, 
borrowers, government agencies, and Wall Street investors, 
banks stopped using the golden rule of "5 C's of credit", from 
capacity to character, in their lending decisions. 
They made loans to borrowers who did not have sufficient 
income (Capacity); borrowers who did not own real estate with 
market values to back the mortgages (Collateral); borrowers 
who did not possess skills or had the education to generate 
future income (Conditions); borrowers who had no other assets 
(Capital); and/or borrowers who had poor credit scores 
(Character). 
The willingness of many lenders to make these kinds of 
risky loans can be traced to the emergence of the secondary 
markets for mortgages. These secondary markets allowed 
lending institutions to sell their mortgages for a discount (the 
price below the principal after adjusting for the time value of 
money), freeing up cash quickly to make more loans. 
Traditionally, most banks owned the mortgage until it was 
paid off and the risk of default was borne by the original 
lender. Once the mortgage could be sold on the secondary 
market, the risk of default was passed on to the buyer. 
Once the lenders figured out that they could keep all the 
associated fees with originating the mortgages but bear 
absolutely no risk of default, the quick slide into today's 
environment became inevitable. 
Government agencies such as Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac 
had been mandated by Congress to provide liquidity in the 
mortgage markets. As a result, the agencies allowed banks to 
sell mortgages before maturity. These agencies were the first 
organizations to start bundling several mortgages and stop 
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worrying about individual defaults in their diversified 
portfolios. Bundling allowed the banks to create a bond-like 
security backed by several, instead of one, mortgage, thus 
making it purportedly more secure for buyers. Even the FHA 
(Federal Housing Authority) insured loans eventually gave in 
to the low standards followed by bankers & brokers. 1 
These low standards initiated by the lending banks by 
ignoring the "5 C's" of credit were eventually embraced by the 
FHA. Most debt experts shared the belief that even if a few 
mortgages went into default, the value of a security backed by 
several hundred loans would not be affected. 
To generate more loans, the lenders began to outsource 
their credit evaluation decisions to brokers and the "5 C's of 
credit" stopped being meaningful--indeed, there is now 
evidence that some brokers were not only negligent, but were 
involved in creating fraudulent documentation. The broker's 
principal motivation was only on one side of the risk-reward 
equation: brokers could keep the fees for originating loans but 
did not suffer any losses if the loan they originated went into 
default. In short, not only did the brokers earned handsome 
commissions based on volume (not quality), but they did not 
have any responsibility if the borrower was unable to pay back 
the loan.2 
Then bankers added another player to the mix: the 
appraiser. The appraiser sets the value of the home. The loan is 
a percentage of that value. Thus, if the appraiser came in with 
an inflated number, the resulting loan was out of proportion to 
the true value of the property. This is not a problem until the 
borrower defaults or wishes to sell the property. Upon default 
with the inflated appraisal, banks and buyers of the bundled 
investments were suddenly suffering losses when the defaulted 
properties resold .. 
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Then another factor emerged. Given the inflated prices 
caused by the erroneous appraisals, many borrowers began to 
doubt whether they could afford the now higher monthly 
payments based on the newly inflated home values. But rather 
than shying away from such purchases, brokers and lenders 
figured out a way around this problem. They "came to the 
rescue" by offering adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) with 
very low teaser rates (significantly below the standard 
mortgage interest rates) to sweeten the initial payments. These 
teaser rates typically reset to higher interest level in 1-2 years.3 
These better rates made reluctant buyers willing to purchase, 
but they also flooded the market with buyers chronically on the 
verge of default. 
Now the "stew" included loaning money to unqualified 
borrowers; loaning too much money based on inflated 
assessments; loaning money not secured by sufficient 
underlying value of the underlying property; and loaning 
money with sharp payment rises that the borrower would be 
unable to make infuturo. 
That is not to say that each of the participating members of 
the transaction was naive or unaware. Even though some media 
has chosen to paint the borrowers as the innocent bystanders, 
borrowers need to acknowledge their part in this debacle. 
When taking out any loan, the borrower's primary 
responsibility is to understand if they can afford the payments 
and the terms of the notes they sign. Many borrowers 
conveniently forgot the "if it is too good to be true then it 
probably is" principle when securing loans with no money 
down and ridiculously low monthly payments. Several 
borrowers are now holding ''upside down" loans (loans where 
the loan amount exceeds the fair market value of the property) 
with no incentive to continue making payments. It is easy for 
borrowers to walk away from these loans, as they have nothing 
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more to lose,4 leaving Wall Street investors, and ultimately, the 
Federal Reserve, to hold the bag. 
Wall Street investors seized upon the securitization ideas 
used by government agencies and introduced many new 
financial products, such as collaterized debt obligations 
5(CDOs) and tranches6, which not only bundled andre-bundled 
mortgages but also traded in the secondary markets.7 
When the CDO's were being created, the investors were 
assured of their safety as some carried default insurance. Once 
again, the insurers did not foresee that several mortgages could 
go in to default simultaneously making it impossible for them 
to make insurance payments. In addition, many of these CDO 's 
were also blessed by the credit rating agencies with AAA 
ratings. Apparently, they were eager to join the band wagon to 
generate revenue without having a full understanding of what 
they were rating. Today, ownership of these types of securities 
is spread across several countries with no practical means of 
tracing the default of any particular loan. The role of bond 
insurers8 and credit rating agencies9 is also being investigated 
with plenty of blame to go around. 
Our central bank, the Federal Reserve (Fed), must own up 
to its own share of the blame. Whether the Fed unknowingly 
contributed to the sub-prime woes arising out of the real estate 
price bubble is an open question. What is certain is the Fed's 
consistent effort in keeping the interest rates low (Federal 
Funds Rate at 1 %) starting in the year 2000 in response to the 
dot.com crisis until the year 2004.10 Such unprecedented low 
interest rates led to the following: 
• New homebuyers who may have waited to save the 
money needed for down payment entered the market; 
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• Existing homeowners engaged in additional mortgage 
activities either to refinance or to buy second homes; 
and 
• Speculators started buying and flipping real estate 
leading to even higher home prices. 
Many solutions have been proposed to manage the problems 
today and to avoid them in the future. One step taken in New 
York at the state level is the Home Equity Theft Prevention 
Act. 
The Home Equity Theft Prevention Act 
Effective February of 2007, the Home Equity Theft 
Prevention Act was passed by the New York State Legislature 
to prevent fraud in the real estate market. In the legislatures' 
view, the increase in foreclosures left open the opportunity for 
unscrupulous lenders to prey on debtors. One way that 
creditors could take advantage of the unwary was if a 
homeowner defaulted or was subject to a foreclosure 
proceeding. Under either scenario, the homeowner was at risk 
of losing his or her home, and thereby 'vulnerable. ' As such, 
the debtor is susceptible to a scheme in which a creditor agrees 
to pay off the mortgage in exchange for the deed. The creditor 
defaults, the bank forecloses, the debtor is homeless and the 
creditor absconds with the mortgage proceeds. Or, the creditor, 
with deed in hand, sells the property to a third party or cashes 
out the equity in the borne, leaving the debtor in a worse 
position than they began with- homeless. 
In effect, the Act amended three separate but interrelated 
New York laws: Section 265 of the New York Real Property 
Law by adding section 265-a, entitled "Home Equity Theft 
Prevention;" Section 595 of the New York Banking Law; and 
75N o1.21/North East Journal of Legal Studies 
Section 1303 of the New York Real Property and Procedures 
Law, 11 each to be discussed below. 
Most writers on the topic agree that the New York 
Legislature's intent was well-meaning, as evidenced by the 
following language setting forth the purpose of the Act: 12 
The intent and purposes of this section are to 
provide a homeowner with information 
necessary to make an informed and intelligent 
decision regarding the sale or transfer of his or 
her home to an equity purchaser; to require that 
the sales agreement be expressed in writing; to 
safeguard equity sellers against deceit and 
financial hardship; to ensure, foster and 
encourage fair dealing in the sale and purchase 
of homes in foreclosure or default; to prohibit 
representations that tend to mislead; to prohibit 
or restrict unfair contract terms; to provide a 
cooling off period for equity sellers who enter 
into covered contracts; to afford equity sellers a 
reasonable and meaningful opportunity to 
rescind sales to equity purchasers; and to 
preserve and protect home equity for the 
homeowners of this state. 13 
By amending the law, the New York Legislature did not 
prevent the transaction from occurring, but instead, structured 
the arrangement so that the debtor receives more protection. 14 
While such an arrangement protects debtors, it also provides 
numerous traps for unknowledgeable purchasers of the 
property as well as title companies trying to comply with the 
minutiae of the statute. 
A. To Whom Does The Law Apply? 
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The new law now designates the parties as the "equity 
seller" and "equity purchaser."15 An equity seller is defined as 
a natural person who is a property owner or homeowner at the 
time ofthe equity sale.16 An equity purchaser may be a person 
who title to a residence that is in foreclosure or 
default, 1 but there are numerous buyers who do not qualify. 
These include: a purchaser who is will occupy the property as 
a residence; a purchaser from a referee in a foreclosure; a 
purchaser taking the property by statute; a purchaser taking the 
title by a court order or judgment; or a purchaser taking title 
from a spouse, parent grandparent, grandchild, or sibling. 18 
Therefore, one could reasonable conclude that most 
transactions are excluded from the statute. The situation that 
attorneys must be wary of is a seller in default or foreclosure 
selling to a buyer who is not going to occupy the property, but 
rather is purchasing it as in investment. 
The Act defines foreclosure as "when a notice of pendency 
is filed in an action under RP APL Article 13 or the Residence 
is on an active tax lien sale list," 19 and default means that the 
equity seller is two months or more behind in his or her 
20 mortgage payments. 
B. How Does One Comply With The Statute? 
Once the purchase and sale transaction is deemed covered 
by the Act, the parties must commit their agreement to writing 
d •21 A . . fi 11 " called a 'covere contract. wntmg, a ter a , ensures, 
fosters and encourages fair dealing; prohibits misleading 
representations; and provides a cooling off period. "22 The 
writing however, is not in compliance with the statute unless it 
consists of eight required components.23 In addition to 
including the usual provisions like names and addresses, the 
covered contract must also include the terms by which the 
reconveyance will be made, a component rarely if ever seen in 
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purchase offers; and a notice of cancellation in a particular 
format.24 
With the notice of cancellation requirement, one should 
recognize that the "picky details" of the Act begin. This is a 
good place to point out, in fact, just how rigid the legislation is, 
and remind the reader that failure to comply may mean the 
entire sale is voidable. The notice tells the equity seller that 
they may cancel the contract by midnight of the fifth business 
day following the execution of the covered contract, and has a 
provision allowing the seller to sign off right on the form to 
effect the provision. 25 In order to legally cancel the 
transaction, a cancellation form must be filled out by the equity 
seller and returned to the buyer;26 if Spanish is the equity 
seller's primary language, the equity seller has the right to have 
a copy of the contract and all attached documents provided in 
Spanish.27 Strict delivery rules also apply.28 
During the five day rescission period, the equity purchaser 
is prohibited from: 
• accepting any instrument of conveyance; 
• recording any instrument executed by the equity seller; 
• transferring or encumbering an interest in the residence; 
• paying consideration to the equity seller; 
• making false or misleading statements? 9 
The covered contract must also be accompanied by yet 
another form on which the seller can cancel the contract, so not 
only does the covered contract have to include the notice of the 
right to cancel, but the form to effectuate the cancellation as 
well. The Notice of Cancellation set out in the statute is 
another example of a hole through which the unwary can fail to 
be in compliance, again making the contract voidable.30 
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C. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Section 1303 
As noted above, the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act 
also amended two other laws. Under McKinney's RP APL § 
1303-"Action to Foreclose a Mortgage"- another notice is 
required that must be delivered with the summons and 
complaint in a foreclosure action. Perhaps the most onerous of 
the requirements in terms of the detail required, this statute 
mandates that: 
The notice required by this section shall be in 
bold, fourteen-point type and shall be printed on 
colored paper that is other than the color of the 
summons and complaint, and the title of the 
notice shall be in bold, twenty-point type. The 
notice shall be on its own page.31 
This law was expanded in the summer of 2008 to include 
more specific language as follows: 
You are in danger of losing your home. If you 
fail to respond to the summons and complaint in 
this foreclosure action, you may lose your 
home. Please read the summons and complaint 
carefully. You should immediately contact an 
attorney or your local legal aid office to obtain 
advice on how to protect yourself 32 
And in an effort to warn sellers in understandable language, 
the warning must also include the following: 
Be careful of people who approach you with 
offers to "save" your home. There are 
individuals who watch for notices of foreclosure 
actions in order to unfairly profit from a 
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homeowner's distress. You should be extremely 
careful about any such promises and any 
suggestions that you pay them a fee or sign over 
your deed. State law requires anyone offering 
such services for profit to enter into a contract 
which fully describes the services they will 
perform and fees they will charge, and which 
prohibits them from taking any money from you 
until have completed all such promised 
services. 3 
In his article on the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act, 
Bruce Bergman questions the efficacy of this legislation 
stating, "There seems little reason to believe that someone 
unsophisticated enough to need the protection of the Act will 
understand the warning of the additional notice or if 
understood, derive any benefit over and above what the Act so 
assiduously applies through its myriad protections. "34 
The statute also includes new required notices going to 
debtors of foreclosed subprime mortgages.35 The amendments 
also amended N.Y. C.P .L.R. § 3408, which now mandates a 
mandatory settlement conference to determine "whether the 
parties can reach a mutually agreeable resolution to help the 
defendant avoid losing his or her home. "36 
D. Section 595 of the New York Banking Law 
The Act also incorporates Section 595-a, which proscribes 
penalties for failure to comply with Section 265-a of the Real 
Property Law. 
Two cases have interpreted the law to date. First, in 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, the plaintiff failed to 
show that the proper 1303 notice was given. 37 Specifically, the 
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plaintiff failed to show in its summons or complaint that he had 
given the proper notice, including the content of the notice, 
type size, and paper color.38 The court stated: 
[T]he plaintiff must submit proper evidentiary 
proof to establish full compliance with the 
substantive and procedural requirements of 
RPAPL § 1303. Merely annexing a copy of a 
purportedly compliant notice does not provide a 
sufficient basis upon which the Court may 
conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff has 
complied with the statute.39 
And in Washington Mut. Bank v. Sholomov, a number of 
requirements under that statute would be triggered, 
requirements which clearly were not followed. 40 Because 
these mandates were not met, the defendant owners might be 
entitled to rescind within two years of the transaction, a period 
that has not yet passed.41 "Obviously, this places the plaintiffs 
mortgage at risk, in that ownership would revert to parties who 
were not the mortgagors."42 
II. PROBLEMS FOR THE PRACTITIONER 
If the equity seller does in fact convey the property under 
the statute and the equity purchaser conveys to a bona fide 
purchaser, who prevails if the seller seeks redemption? The 
answer gives real estate attorneys and title companies pause. 
The statute allows an equity seller a two-year redemption 
period following the transference of the property. If the parties 
fail to comply with any part of the statute, then the equity seller 
can file a notice of rescission by "giving written notice to the 
equity purchaser . . . if the purchaser is not a bona fide 
purchaser for value and filing a notice of rescission with the 
county clerk. "43 Then, the equity purchaser has twenty days to 
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reconvey the property back to the seller. Additionally the 
purchaser has to return any consideration received from the 
equity purchaser.44 Sellers may also recover costs and 
attorneys' fees as well as suing for damages.45 If the purchaser 
is found to have been involved in fraud or deceit, then there is 
an added provision for a class E felony and fines up to 
$25,000.00.46 Although the intent of the law serves a "public 
good" the law actually raises many issues as yet untested. 
What is title insurers worried about? Given the detail of the 
statute, how can a title company possibly ensure that the 
various details of the statute were in fact complied with? For 
example, the title agent would be insuring that the proper 
notices were given to the seller; that if the seller was in 
foreclosure, another notice was given; that all of the notices 
were in the correct form. How will a title company know if the 
correct notices were given? 
At this point, the only recommendation to avoid potential 
liability is to have the sellers execute an affidavit at closing 
verifying that the house is not in default; not the subject of a 
foreclosure proceeding; and the buyer is purchasing the 
property for a private residence. If all of these statements are 
true, then the statute does not apply. Nevertheless, the statute 
still defeats part of its purpose by making title insurance more 
difficult to obtain, which may result in buyers unable to obtain 
financing for the transaction. Making foreclosed homes more 
difficult to buy will only escalate the current mortgage crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
While a few states are now enacting legislation to protect 
homeowners who are defaulting on their loans, or being 
foreclosed against, the legislation is unwieldy and complicated. 
Most debtors will find the protections arduous. States cannot be 
faulted for trying to protect their citizens, but the foreclosure 
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crisis will not succumb to a quick fix. While this legislation 
might be a small step toward debtor protection, it will be up to 
the courts to determine how effective a protection it will really 
tum out to be. 
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equity purchaser shall return without condition any 
original covered contract and any other documents signed 
by the equity seller as well as any fee or other 
consideration received by the equity purchaser from the 
equity seller. Cancellation of the contract shall release the 
equity seller of all obligations to pay fees to the equity 
purchaser. 
29 N.Y. R.P.L. § 265-a(7). 
30 The Notice of Cancellation states: 
You may cancel this contract for the sale of your house, 
without any penalty 
or obligation, at any time before 
midnight of 
(Enter date) 
To cancel this transaction, personally deliver a signed and 
dated copy of this cancellation notice, or send it by 
facsimile, United States mail, or an established commercial 
letter delivery service, indicating cancellation to 
N.Y. R.P.L. § 265(6)(a). 
31 N.Y. R.P.A.P.L. § 1303(2) (McKinney's _ and Supp. 2008). 
32 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 475, at§ 1. 
33 Jd. 
34 Bruce J. Bergman, Home Equity Theft Prevent Act, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 
2007 at 5. 
35 Specifically, the 2008 Session Laws amended Section 1304 of the Real 
Property Actions and Proceedings Law as follows: 
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1. Notwithstanding any other prov1s1on of law, with 
regard to a high-cost home loan, as such term is defined in 
section six-! of the banking law, a subprime home loan or 
a non-traditional home loan, at least ninety days before a 
lender or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal 
action against the borrower, including mortgage 
foreclosure, the lender or mortgage loan servicer shall 
give notice to the borrower in at least fourteen-point type 
which shall include the following: 
"YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME. 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING 
NOTICE CAREFULLY" 
"As of ... , your home Joan is ... days in 
default. Under New York State Law, we 
are required to send you this notice to 
inform you that you are at risk of losing 
your home. You can cure this default by 
making the payment of ..... dollars by 
If you are experiencing financial 
difficulty, you should know that there 
are several options available to you that 
may help you keep your home. 
Attached to this notice is a list of 
government approved housing 
counseling agencies in your area which 
provide free or very low-cost 
counseling. You should consider 
contacting one of these agencies 
immediately. These agencies specialize 
in helping homeowners who are facing 
financial difficulty. Housing counselors 
can help you assess your financial 
condition and work with us to explore 
the possibility of modifYing your loan, 
establishing an easier payment plan for 
you, or even working out a period of 
loan forbearance. If you wish, you may 
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also contact us directly at .......... and ask 
to discuss possible options. 
While we cannot assure that a mutually 
agreeable resolution is possible, we 
encourage you to take immediate steps 
to try to achieve a resolution. The 
longer you wait, the fewer options you 
may have. 
If this matter is not resolved within 90 
days from the date this notice was 
mailed, we may commence legal action 
against you (or sooner if you cease to 
live in the dwelling as your primary 
residence.) 
If you need further information, please 
call the New York State Banking 
Department's toll-free helpline at l-877-
BANK-NYS (l-877-226-5697) or visit 
the Department's website at 
http://www.banking.state.ny.us" 
2. Such notice shall be sent by the lender or mortgage 
loan servicer to the borrower, by registered or certified 
mail and also by first-class mail to the last known address 
of the borrower, and if different, to the residence which is 
the subject of the mortgage. Notice is considered given as 
of the date it is mailed. The notice shall contain a list of at 
least five United States department of housing and urban 
development approved housing counseling agencies, or 
other housing counseling agencies as designated by the 
division of housing and community renewal, that serve 
the region where the borrower resides. The list shall 
include the counseling agencies' last known addresses and 
telephone numbers. The banking department and/or the 
division of housing and community renewal shall make 
available a listing, by region, of such agencies which the 
lender or mortgage loan servicer may use to meet the 
requirements of this section. 
2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 475, at§ 2. 
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